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Since the end of the last Century labour migra-
tion has become a major feature of societies in
southern Africa. Much attention has been paid
to the labour migration from the 'BLS countries'
(Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) to South
Africa (see for example Elkan 1978, Kowet 1978,
De Vletter 1985). The single most important fea-
ture of this labour migration is that it is circular
and purely temporary, hardly ever for more than
two years (Elkan 1978: 145). Migrants return
home, though the likelihood is that in the course
of their lives they will migrate several times. The
main reason for this circular migration is that
the South African Government does not permit
migrants to stay longer than two years and ac-
commodation is provided for the worker alone.
This régulation forces the migrant's family to stay
in the country of origin.
As labour migration to South Africa is a pro-
nounced feature of Swazi society, its impact on
Swazi society is substantial. In 1990, 14,638
Swazi were recruited for mines in South Africa,
which is 13.5 percent of the Swazi labour force
reported to be in paid formal employment (Cen-
tral Statistical Office 1990). The importance of
labour migration for Swaziland is reflected in
the number of publications on this subject. ' Most
of these studies deal with labour migration at a
macro-level and analyze nation-wide figures on
this phenomenon, investigate its causes and dis-
cuss its economie, social and political implica-
tions. This paper seeks to make a contribution to
the discussion on what labour migration means
to the social security rôle of the Swazi rural home-
stead. It is widely acknowledged in the literature
on social security that in the rural areas of devel-
oping countries the domestic unit of production
and consumption plays, among others, an im-
portant rôle in providing social security to its
members. In rural Swaziland the homestead per-
forms this rôle, and accordingto custom "a Swazi
is entitled to assistance and protection from nis
urnuti (homestead, A.L.) in time of need, as when
hè is ill or infïrm, disabled or too old to fend for
himself, or else afflicted with misfortune. In
short, it provides him with a comprehensive se-
curity he can scarcely find in any alternative in-
stitution or body" (Ngubane 1983: 103). Many
studies on the Swazi rural homestead (Kuper
1947 and 1963, Marwick 1966, Ngubane 1983,
Russell 1983 and 1984) emphasize its social se-
curity rôle and the entitlement of the homestead
members to this social security.
An important question remains, however:
whether or not the homestead as a social group
is actually able to meet the social security de-
mands that come from within the homestead. As
Partsch (1983: 62-8) noted, the size of a social
group, its composition, its durability, its capac-
ity to raise means, and the existence of a 'nor-
mative insurance' largely détermine whether or
not a social group can also act as a solidarity
group. A solidarity group can be understood as a
group in which goods, money and labour are
transferred from active members, who mostly are
able to provide themselves with suffïcient means
for subsistence, to inactive members who can-
not, because of old age, sickness, unemployment,
and so forth. By discussing the relationship be-
tween labour migration and the conditions men-
tioned for a solidarity group, the impact of la-
bour migration on the rural homestead as soli-
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darity group will be estimated. For this purpose
a group of homesteads with migrants in South
Afiica is compared with a group of homesteads
without them. Data are derived from a 1990 sur-
vey among 115 rural homesteads situated on
Swazi Nation Land (SNL).2
A good understanding of the influence of la-
bour migration on the homestead as solidarity
group requires some insight into what the home-
stead is. In the next section the view on this ques-
tion adopted in this article is briefiy explained.
Followed by an analysis of the impact of labour
migration on the economie position of the home-
stead. The last three sections will analyze the
impact of labour migration on, respectively, the
size and composition of the homestead, its dura-
bility, and the existence of a 'normative insur-
ance', and are followedby the main conclusions,
to struck the balance.
The Swazi rural homestead
The homestead as the basic social and economie
unit in Swaziland has been widely discussed by
social scientists.3 What exactly is a homestead?
The term 'homestead' already highlights that it
is neither a village nor simply a household.
Hughes (1972:69) indicates that the term 'home-
stead' is used to refer to a physical entity (huts,
cattle byre and arable lands) as well as to à spé-
cifie social group. To avoid confusion I adhère
to the common practice of most social scientists
in Swaziland of designating by 'homestead' the
social group.
In its earliest descriptions (see Kuper 1947 and
1963, Marwick 1966) the homestead (umutï) is
described as a family group having large mem-
bership, male household heads, agnatic relation-
ships (plus affinai relationships of wives marry-
ing into the homestead), multiple marital links
through polygyny and married sons remaining
in the homestead, and a three or four généra-
tions' depth (Allen 1973: 45). In this ethno-
graphie or classic model (Allen 1973, Standing
1987) the homestead is subdivided into several
households (tindlü). These households rnay cen-
tre around the headman's wife or wives and their
(unmarried) children, or around married broth-
ers and sons with their wives and children. Kuper
(1964: 20) describes these households as semi-
independent social and economie units that nev-
ertheless stay an integral part of the homestead.
Economically the homestead is considered to be
self-sufficient in agricultural production, and may
send out migrants to supplement its income and
to satisfy spécifie cash needs. Social and eco-
nomie relations within the homestead have a re-
ciprocal and redistributive character, which are
vested in kinship relations. Inequalities among
homestead members are offset in time and have
a temporary character. Men accumulate livestock
îo set against future marriage payments, and the
redistributive pressures of kinship obligations
militate against long-term stratégies of accumu-
lation, whether in livestock or in cash (Standing
1987: 129).
In the classic model the starting point for the
homestead's dynamics is the access to SNL
(Swazi Nation Land), and the customary right
of all Swazi adult men to claim parcels of land
from a chief on which to set up independent
homesteads. These claims arise from the home-
stead development cycle and from Swazi inher-
itance practices. The practices of patrilineality
and primogeniture extrude women and younger
men from the homestead. Married women leave
the parental homestead and live on the husband's
homestead; younger men eventually set up rep-
lica homesteads elsewhere. The process is cycli-
cal and répétitive, generaled endogenously by
intra-homestead growth and fission. It is also self-
contained and self-producing, being carried on
in relative isolation from wider processes. Such
a self-contained unit, then, is considered to be
able to perform the many fonctions it has in Swazi
society: economie, educational, cérémonial, and
legal.
However, even from simple observations made
when travelling through rural areas in Swaziland,
one begins seriously to doubt the accuracy under
present conditions of the ethnographie model of
the homestead. Standing (1987: 129) doubts
whether "in the light of Swaziland's history of
continuai social transformation, (...) this has ever
been an adequate représentation of rural social
relations". Low (1986:80) concludes thaf'while
such groupings still exist, they now no longer
constitute the norm". Russell (1989) cornes to
the same conclusion when arguing that the clas-
sic model "tends to stress the norm rather than
reality". Recent data confirm these statements.
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The latest population census revealed that only
16.5 percent of the homesteads on SNL contained
two or more households (Central Statistical Of-
fice 1986). De Vletter (1983) recorded only 5
percent of homesteads that were polygynous. In
other fieldwork reports one can read that the
three-generation homestead also is less to be
found on SNL (Holleman 1964, Allen 1973,
Russell 1989). In the sample analyzed in this
article 18.5 percent of the homesteads consist of
two or more households, and 44.4 percent of the
sample are two-generation homesteads.
Besides différences in size and composition
other research has shown that economie différ-
ences among homesteads have also increased
(Central Statistical Office 1985, De Vletter 1983,
Neocosmos 1987). Larger différences in wealth
and income among homesteads can be observed
than the représentatives of the classic homestead
model proclaim. This is the result of the differ-
ent positions homesteads have in the Swazi
economy, in which for a Century market relations
have increasingly corne to dominate. The obser-
vation made by the ethnographers that all home-
steads live simply from subsistence production,
occasionally supplemented with cash income
from migrant labour, is hard to sustain nowa-
days. In sum, there is substantial agreement
among social scientists that nowadays the eth-
nographie homestead model may represent one
type of homestead, but will certainly not be rep-
résentative for all Swazi rural homesteads on
SNL.
The above observations hâve strong repercussions
for our analysis. It is very likely that thé impact
of labour migration on thé homestead as solidar-
ity group will vary with thé différences among
homesteads on SNL. Therefore, thé social and
économie différences among homesteads should
be incorporated in thé analysis. A useful attempt
to model social and économie differentiation
among homesteads is made by Low (1986), who
introduced his theory of the 'homestead devel-
opment cycle'. Low's views reflect the ideas of
Fortes (1970), Goody (1971) and Chayanov
(1966) on thé existence of developmental cycles
in domestic groups. The main idea is that each
homestead has a lifecycle. In each stage not only
thé size and composition of the homestead
changes, but also its économie position and thé
so called consumers/workers ratio. Low (1986:
79) distinguishes five stages in what he calls thé
homestead development cycle:
1. Establishment: when a house is built and an
enterprise (farm) is established. At this stage
Fortes recognized that there may still be a con-
tinued dependence on thé parental group with
the transfer of capital resources and thé courting
and marriage of a spouse.
2. Expansion', thé homestead becomes more
clearly independent and children are born.
3. Consolidation: expansion to its fullest point,
embodying thé highest ideas of family develop-
ment.
4. Fission: thé stage where children marry and
leave thé parental homestead. This may be asso-
ciated with thé relinquishing of control of do-
mestic resources from thé parental to thé filial
génération.
5. Décline: thé final stage, which is contempo-
raneous with and often contributes to thé expan-
sion stage in thé filial group if thé ageing couple
are located within one of their children's home-
steads.
It should be noted that thé stages might not be
as clear-cut as presented. Fortes (1971: 5) argues
that thé stages may overlap each other and, there-
fore, he prefers to use the term 'phase' instead of
'stage'. For example, often thé filial génération
will remain in thé parental group through mar-
riage and the birth of the first children. A new
domestic unit will then be established by parents
aîready with young children. At the other end of
thé cycle, thé fission stage is delayed and, if thé
delay is long enough, thé décline stage may be
avoided altogether. And in a polygynous home-
stead thé five stages will be coincidental in sub-
sections of thé homestead, which makes it very
diflficult to estimate thé phase of the homestead.
Low's view on thé Swazi homestead is adopted
in this article. The main reason is that the model
explicitly refers to most of the conditions for a
solidarity group, including size, composition,
durability, and, indirectly, économie position.
Using Low's criteria for classifying homesteads
(see Appendix A), the sample of 115 homesteads
is stratified as presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. Classification of homesteads according to phase in thé development cycle
Homesteads
with migrant
labourers
Homesteads
without
migrant
labourers
Total
Homestead development cycle
Estab-
lishment
9
12.7 %
7
15.9 %
16
13.9%
Expansion
13
18.3%
10
22.7 %
23
20.0 %
Consoli-
dation
22
30.9 %
5
11.4%
27
23.4 %
Fission
7
9.1%
8
18.2%
15
13.0%
Décline
2
2.6 %
10
22.7 %
12
10.4%
Multi-
household
homesteads
18
26.4 %
4
9.1 %
22
18.5%
Total
71
61.7%
44
38.3 %
115
100 %
Source: 1990 survey
Given thé type of survey, whereby homesteads
were interviewée! at one moment in time only,
and less information on the history of the home-
stead was collected, it is important to remember
that there will be a continuous shift of home-
steads from one phase toanother. Table 1 présents
static data only. For thé analysis it is, however,
necessary to discern that a homestead in thé es-
tablishment phase will in a few years be in thé
expansion phase, and so on. Another qualifying
remark relates to thé type of homesteads that are
used. As argued above, for homesteads with two
or more households it is very difficult to esti-
mate their stage in thé development cycle. There-
fore, thé homesteads with two or more house-
holds are included in thé analysis as a separate
category. This smaîl group can be considered as
representing the classic homestead model, but
in contrast with the ethnographie view, this group
is thé exception rather than thé rule.
Labour migration and thé éco-
nomie position of the homestead
The production and income that is realized by
thé homestead's productive activities, and thé
wealth that can be built up, are important factors
for a homestead to be able to function as solidar-
ity group. When there are no means présent to
be redistributed between active and non-active
members, thé homestead cannot perforai ils so-
cial security rôle. Labour migration influences
four major éléments of the homestead's économie
position: thé level of production and income, thé
économie vulnerability, thé intra-homestead in-
come distribution, and its wealth.
The first important effect of labour migration
on thé homestead's économie position is its posi-
tive contribution to thé homestead's income by
migrants sending home rernittances. What is
actually thé contribution of those rernittances
from South Africa? From Table 2 it becomes clear
that homesteads with migrant labour hâve on
average a higher disposable income in ail stages
of the development cycle than homesteads with-
out migrant labour. This also holds for thé dis-
posable income per resident homestead member
(given in brackets). When thé composition of the
disposable income is considered, it is interesting
to observe that thé homesteads without migrant
labour in most stages mainly dépend on income
frorn other income-generating activities (rural
industry), and not on income from agricultural
activities. Agricultural income does at the most
constitute 50 percent of total disposable income
(expansion stage). As is outlined elsewhere
(Neocosmos 1987), the economie conditions pre-
vailing in the agricultural sector in Swaziland
are unfavourable to small 'peasant' producers.
To go into more detail on this question would go
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beyond the scope of this article. This section con-
centrâtes further on the rôle of labour migration
in the homestead's economie position. Looking
again at the impact of labour migration on the
homestead's income, a décline of the share of
remittances in the disposable income can be ob-
served through the homestead development cy-
cle. Homesteads in the establishment stage are
highly dependent on remittances, while for home-
steads in the consolidation stage and the multi-
household homesteads the remittances have a
minor share in the total disposable income. These
différences can partly be explained by having a
closer look at the reasons for labour migration
through the homestead's development cycle.
Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988: 230) state
that the extent to which a homestead will have
means available for social security purposes dé-
pends on the continuity of its income-generating
activities in time. This, in turn, requires that the
younger générations on the homestead ultimately
must have access to resources, which is realized
by the prevailing System of property rights and
succession, and the options to engage in economie
activities. Although every young male adult in
Swaziland has the customary right to a parcel of
SNL, and the eldest sons of a family will inherit
most of the parents' wealth, this is insufficient
nowadays to start an own enterprise and home-
stead.
Land is becoming scarce, and the parents' wealth
should not be overestimated in rural areas where
poverty is the rule. For the younger sons it is,
therefore, necessary to raise funds themselves
with which they can establish their own home-
steads. Such a fund can be established by work-
ing as family labourer for the parents, or initially
working as sharecropper for the parents, who
advance part of the resources. However, work-
ing as family labourer is not very profitable, and
in many cases parents do not have funds to ad-
vance. Labour migration is one of the remaining
options, then, for young man to accumulate
Table 2. Disposable homestead income from productive activities in Emalangeni (see note 4);
disposable income per resident homestead member in Emalangeni (presented in parentheses in the
column Disp. Inc.); the incomes from different productive activities in Emalangeni, and the share of
these incomes in the total disposabie homestead income in percentages; all figures distinguished by
homesteads with and without migrant labour and by stage in the homestead development cycle.
Stage in
dev. cycle
Estab-
lishment
Expansion
Conso-
lidation
Fission
Décline
Multi-h.h.
homesteads
Homesteads with migrant labour
Income from productive activities (in E.)
(share in total disposable income)
Disp.
Inc.per
head
2,743
(756)
2,950
(420)
5,790
(560)
3,750
(570)
1,900
(410)
5,780
(390)
Subs.
Agt.
330
9.3%
240
8.1%
570
9.8%
200
5.3%
100
5.3%
470
8.1%
Corn.
Agt.
100
2.8%
170
5.7%
960
16.5%
320
8.5%
350
18.4%
810
14.0%
0.1.
G.A
80
2.2%
430
14.6%
1,570
27.1%
430
11.5%
140
7.4%
1,350
23.3%
Remitt.
S.A.
2,030
74.0%
1,170
39.6%
1,270
21.9%
1,940
51.8%
1,200
63.2%
1,370
23.7%
Homesteads without migrant labour
Income from productive activities (in E.)
(share in total disposable income)
Disp.
Inc.per
head
2,850
(580)
2,430
(590)
4,480
(230)
2,310
(310)
1,180
(380)
6,280
(412)
Subs.
Agt.
285
10.0%
507
20.8%
518
11.6%
260
11.3%
140
11.9%
708
11.3%
Comm.
Agt.
495
17.4%
740
30.5%
508
11.3%
620
26.8%
210
17.8%
1,795
28.6%
O.I.
G.A.
2,070
72.6%
890
36.6%
3,034
67.7%
990
42.9%
610
51.7%
3,780
60.2%
Source: 1990 Survey
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fonds. This motive for labour migration will pre-
vail among migrants from homesteads in thé
consolidation and fission stage (see also Rosen-
Prinz and Prinz 1978). The lovver remittances
can also be explained, then. Young men want to
accumulate fonds and keep these fiinds for them-
selves. They are not so much concerned with thé
économie position of thé parent's homestead, but
more with thé establishment and économie posi-
tion of their own future homesteads. In this way
their labour migration does not contribute much
to an increase in thé économie position of the
parent's homestead.
Having established own homesteads thé rea-
sons for labour migration might difîer. One rea-
son might be that thé young homestead head does
not have access yet to sufficient land and other
agricultural resources to start a profitable farm.
Additional income is necessary to buy food and
to foîfil other cash needs. In this case labour
migration is to supplément low agricultural in-
come. It is now the young men's own homestead
he migrâtes for; hè is the head and as such re-
sponsible for the economie welfare of the home-
stead members. It is not surprising to find, then,
that thé amount of remittances is considérable
in thé establishment stage, and forais a large part
of the homestead's disposable income. In thé
expansion stage other income-generating activi-
ties will start to rise, because children grow up,
which gives thé wife on thé homestead opportu-
nities to be engaged in income-generating ac-
tivities.5 She will normally be engaged in what
is referred to as 'rural industry'. Labour migra-
tion might still be a must when the access to ag-
ricultural resources is restricted or other income-
generating activities are difficult to achieve. But
in this stage labour migration might also be a
choice, when labour migration turns out to be
more profitable than agricultural or other income-
generating activities. In thé latter case it is rather
taking advantage of différent économie opportu-
nities which are open to mâle and female home-
stead members, than reasons of sheer necessity
that détermine labour migration.
Of course, also the growth of the new home-
stead will corne to an end, and the consolidation
stage starts. In this stage, as described, one or
more of the sons might consider labour migra-
tion as an option to raise fonds and become in-
dependent of their parent's homestead. The
homestead cannot expect many remittances and
will have to rely on thé other income-generating
activities. Agricultural activities and rural indus-
try will form a large part of the homestead's in-
come. In thé fission stage children will marry
and leave thé homestead. For thé ageing parents
it becomes more difficult to realize an own in-
come, and this will be a point in time when the
control over domestic resources is relinquished.
When children are engaged in labour migration
at this stage of the homestead, still with the pur-
pose to collect own fonds, social obligations,
however, for taking care of the parents will re-
suit in higher remittances than in thé consolida-
tion stage. Combined with the declining produc-
tion of the parents, remittances will îake a large
share in the homestead's income. The same ar-
gument can be followed for the décline stage.
But in this stage the situation might be such that
the ageing couple has already transferred the
homestead headship, and thereby the control over
the domestic resources, which means that at the
same time a new homestead is established. Re-
mittances are made, then, ïo support the aged
and to supplement the new homestead's income.
In sum, the contribution of labour migration to
the homestead's income varies to a large extent
with the motives underlying labour migration.
The reasons for labour migration reflect the dif-
ferent positions male homestead members have
through the homestead deveiopment cycle. In
daily practice Ihis might mean that homesteads
have migrants in all stages of their deveiopment
cycle, and that this has become a structural fea-
ture of Swazi rural homesteads.
Besides the contribution of labour migration to
the homestead's disposable income, another di-
mension of labour migration is its impact on the
homestead's vulnerability to fluctuations in in-
come as a resuit of changes in the economie con-
ditions. A well-known strategy of rural house-
holds in developing countries is to reduce their
economie vulnerability by diversifying income
sources and types of produce. Income génération
is spread over productive activities that do not
share the same risks. In this way homesteads can
prevent the simultaneous loss of all produce or
income in times of adversity. Table 3 présents
the extent of diversification of income sources.
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Table 3. Homesteads and thé number of income sources (in % of homesteads in each stage)
Stages in
homestead
development
cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Multi-h.h.
homesteads
Homesteads with migrant labour
Number of Income Sources
(besides subs. agr.)
subs. agr.
87.5
83.3
95.5
83.3
n.a.
94.1
1
55.6
23.1
4.5
14.3
n.a.
0.0
2
33.3
38.5
36.4
71.4
n.a.
44.4
3
11.1
38.5
59.1
14.3
n.a.
100.0
Homesteads without migrant labour
Number of Income Sources
(besides subs. agr.)
subs. agr.
100.0
100.0
80.0
100.0
50.0
100.0
1
57.1
50.0
80.0
37.5
80.0
0.0
2
42.9
50.0
20.0
50.0
20.0
100.0
Source: 1990 Survey
It can be concluded that homesteads with and
without migrant labour have spread their activi-
ties to thé same extent, except for thé homesteads
in thé consolidation stage. Homesteads without
migrant labour mostly hâve one income source,
which nevertheless seems to provide a relatively
high income (see Table 2). Homesteads with
migrant labour in thé consolidation stage hâve
two or three sources of income. This may be ex-
plained by thé above observation that migrants
in this stage do not send significant remittances
home. Homestead members hâve therefore also
to be engaged in other income-generating activi-
ties in order to secure an income.
With respect to labour migration and vulner-
ability two remarks can be made. Firstly, the
homesteads with only one source of income, of
course, are the most vulnérable. Thèse home-
steads can, also not surprisingly, be found among
relatively 'young' homesteads of both catégories
in thé expansion stage and thé relatively 'older'
homesteads without migrant labour in thé con-
solidation and décline stage. Homesteads in thé
establishment stage usually hâve a limited re-
source base (labour force, labour time, land and
capital), while homesteads without migrant la-
bour in thé décline stage usually are confronted
with a diminishing resource base. Being heavily
dépendent on one source of income makes thé
homesteads at both ends of the development cy-
cle the most vulnérable for a large collapse in
income when thé sole source of income is dis-
turbed.
The second remark refers to thé conditions
under which production and income are gener-
ated. The présence or absence of migrant labour
places thé two groups of homesteads difTerently
in thé wider economy. The success or failure of
income-generating activities of homesteads with-
out migrant labour dépend heavily on thé opéra-
tion of agricultural and industrial input and out-
put markets. This makes thèse homesteads' in-
comes vulnérable to fluctuations in these mar-
kets: priées of inputs and output may suddenly
change, inputs may not be available at the time
they are needed, demand may collapse, and so
on. Moreover, agricultural activities are also sub-
ject to fluctuations in ecological and natural con-
ditions. With one storm or one dry season ail
production can be lost. In contrast, the home-
steads that dépend heavily on migrant labour are
dépendent on thé fluctuating and highly unsta-
ble labour market in South Africa. Unemploy-
ment is a serious threat to their income base, but
also décline in wages, illness, and employment
injuries, will, with thé absence of sufficient state-
organized social securiry provisions, affect the
homestead's income.
The third way in which labour migration affects
the homestead's economie position, and thereby
its rôle as solidarity group, is by influencing the
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intra-homestead distribution of the disposable
income. This intra-homestead distribution is
important firom a social security point of view,
because in Swaziland, as elsewhere in the région,
the daily care of the non-active homestead mem-
bers (mainly children and the old) is a task of
women. It can be assumed, then, that of the in-
come which accrues to women a larger part will
be spent on the welfare of these homestead mem-
bers, while income that accrues to men will also
serve other purposes than the welfare of the non-
active homestead members. Studies (SSRU1990,
Russell 1984) on this issue confirm this assump-
tion. Labour migration to South Africa is male
dominated. This means that the wages earned
accrue in the first instance to male homestead
members. Rural industry activities are female
dominated. Income from these activities will ac-
crue to women. Income from agricultural activi-
ties accrues to both men and women. Men often
receive the revenues from commercial maize and
cotton production, while women receive money
when they seil vegetables from their garden. Ta-
ble 4 présents the shares of women and men in
the homestead's disposable income.
Table 4 shows considérable différences between
homesteads with and homesteads without mi-
grant labour. Three reasons can be given for these
findings. Firstly, remittances are mostly send to
women (wives or mother) in the homestead (see
also Russell 1984). Secondly, in homesteads with
migrant labour, women have freedom to engage
in income-generating activities and more con-
trol over their monetary earnings, because the
male members are absent. And thirdly, when men
are absent, women are very likely to obtain the
money that is raised with commercial maize and
cotton production. Although this money in a strict
sensé belongs to men, women receive the money
and will spend it. In most cases it will suffice to
teil her husband what she spent it on.
From Table 4 it can also be concluded that the
intra-homestead distribution of disposable in-
come differs through the homestead development
cycle. In the establishment and expansion stages
disposable income will largely accrue to women,
as the, often, only adult male will be absent. In
the consolidation stages more males will be avail-
able and stay on the homestead, which will di-
rect disposable income more to them. In the fis-
sion and décline stages income will accrue more
to women again, because more remittances are
sent home (see also Table 2), and in this group
of homesteads more widows can be found who
have to take care of their own economie affairs.
In sum, it can be argued that with respect to
intra-homestead distribution of income, labour
migration positively influences the rôle of the
homestead as solidarity group. Women receive a
larger share of disposable income, and other re-
search has shown that women spend their in-
come more in favour of the non-active homestead
members.
The last issue in this section is whether there ij
any relationship between the wealth of home-
steads and migrant labour. Because land canno
be privately owned, private savings are the mair
form of wealth. In situations of low real interes
Table 4. Shares of female and mâle homesteads members in homestead disposable income
Stages in
development
cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Homesteads with migrant labour
Female share in
disposable income
77%
62%
54%
75%
n.a.
Male share in
disposable income
23%
38%
46%
25%
n.a.
Homesteads without migrant labour
Female share in
disposable income
31%
27%
10%
47%
47%
Mâle share in
disposable income
69%
73%
90%
53%
53%
Source: 1990 Survey
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rates, savings can be best invested in 'real es-
tate', which in Swazi rural areas is mainly cat-
tle. Table 5 shows that différences with respect
to cattle ownership do exist between homesteads
with and without migrant labour. However, it is
difficult to say whether this can be attributed to
migrant labour or not. As in many African soci-
eties, cattle are only partly obtained from thé
market. As cattle are, besides money, thé main
units in which thé bride priée is paid, homesteads
obtain cattle also in other ways. Partly for this
reason homesteads in thé consolidation stage
hâve more cattle than in other stages: daughters
are getting married and homesteads receive cat-
tle when thé daughter leaves. Moreover, in thé
course of the homestead's development cycle,
cattle are accumulated through breeding and
through thé market, in order to pay the bride priée
when sons of the homesteads get married. Ail
these reasons, however, may explain différences
between stages in thé development cycle, but not
between migrant and non-migrant homesteads.
Tentatively two possible explanations for thé
impact of labour migration on cattle wealth can
be put forward. Firstly, as we saw, homesteads
with migrant labourers hâve more money income
available than homesteads without. This means
that homesteads with migrant labour can more
easily acquire cattle from thé market and are not
solely dépendent on non-market transfers of cat-
tle. As far as thé migrant's income is not spent
on daily necessities and his own maintenance, it
is very likely that thé 'surplus' income will be
invested in cattle. As said, cattle are a safe form
of saving, will keep their value and can easily be
sold in case of contingencies. In this respect la-
bour migration may contribute to a stronger po-
sition of the homestead as solidarity group.
A second explanation is related to the motives
for migration. In homesteads with migrant la-
bour, and in the later stages of the development
cycle, thé migrants are usually young men who
still have to pay their bride priée or part of it,
and spend part of their income on buying cattle.
The cattle they buy are not meant to be a form of
savings in times of need, but serve the purpose
of accumulating resources in order to start an
own homestead. By doing wage labour in South
Africa, thèse cattle can be accumulated.
Labour migration and thé size and
composition of the homestead
For a group to be a solidarity group thé size and
composition of the group are important condi-
tions, because they détermine on how many mem-
bers thé bürden falls of taking care of the inac-
tive members of the group. The larger the size
the less the bürden for each productive member.
Table 5. Percentage of homesteads owning cattle and average number of cattle owned
(by stage in the development cycle)
Stages in
development
cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Multi household
homesteads
Homesteads with migrant labour
% Homesteads
owning cattle
100.0
85.3
85.7
100.0
n.a.
88.9
Average number
o f cattle
8.3
102
12.0
11.0
n a.
17.5
Homesteads without migrant labour
% Homesteads
owning cattle
714
50.0
75.0
375
50.0
750
Average number
of cattle
4.6
3.2
10.5
6.9
8.1
19.0
Source: 1990 Survey
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Partsch (1983: 65) suggests that a group, there-
fore, should be larger than the nuclear family, to
discuss in a sensible way social protection within
family groups. Homestead sizes do vary widely,
depending on both the stage of the development
cycle and the extent to which they contain one
or more households. In the total sample of 115
homesteads the average homestead size was 10. l
persons, but behind this average a variation could
be found from l to 30 persons constituting the
homestead.
Labour migration influences, of course, nega-
tively the average size of the homestead in terms
of homestead résidents. Table 6 shows that for
homesteads with migrant labour the average
homestead size differs considerably from the
homestead size when only resident members are
included. Of course, the effect of absentée mem-
bers on the total size of the homestead is larger
in the already relatively small homesteads (es-
tablishment and décline stage). The group of
multi-household homesteads has a relatively high
figure of absentées that can be attributed to each
household having its 'own' migrant labourer.
Although the différences between total homestead
size and resident size can be largely explained
by absent migrant labourers, différences can also
be attributed to absent children. These young
absentée children are temporary resident on other
homesteads, because their own parents cannot
maintain them or because they live nearer to
school.
The impact of labour migration on the size of
the homestead is evident. Far more important
than size, however, is the composition of the
homestead, and how this is influenced by hav-
ing migrant labourers. The composition of the
group must be such that at any point in time suf-
ficient active members are present to raise and
transfer means to the non-active group members.
This, in turn, requires that not all members face
the same risks at the same time in order not to
lose all the homestead's income when a risk oc-
curs. To speak with Pïatteau (1991: 139), one
could say that the relative absence of covariate
risks makes a group better suited to function as
solidarity group. This can be reached by having
the population of the solidarity group spread over
several age groups, both sexes, and different in-
come-generating activities. To the impact of la-
bour migration on the spread of income sources
we already gave attention in the previous sec-
tion. In this section we concentrate on the rela-
tionship between labour migration and the ratio
actives/non-actives. In Table 7 data on this ques-
tion are presented.
Table 6. Average homestead size, average homestead size of resident members, average absentée
ratio as percentage of average total homestead size
Stages in
development
cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Multi household
homesteads
Homesteads with migrant labour
Average
homesteads
size
5.3
8.3
13.3
8.8
6.0
19.2
Average
size
excluding
absentées
4.1
7.3
10.8
6.5
4.0
159
Absentée
ratio
0.22
0.12
0.19
0.26
0.33
0.17
Homesteads without migrant labour
Average
homesteads
size
4.9
8.0
11.2
8.0
34
16.2
Average
size
excluding
absentées
4.9
7.8
10.2
7.5
3.4
16.0
Absentée
ratio
000
003
0.09
0.06
0.00
0.01
Source: 1990 Survey
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Table 7. Number of active resident producers, number of children and elderly on homestead, and
percentage of female headed homesteads
Stages in
development
cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Multi
Household
homesteads
Homesteads with migrant labour
No. of
active
res.
produ-
cers
1.1
2.2
3.8
2.0
2.0
6.1
No. of
children
«16)
2.9
4.9
6.5
3.1
1.5
9.3
No. of
elderly
(>55)
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.4
1.0
1.1
Depend-
ency
ratio
2.9
3.2
2.3
2.8
2.0
1.9
%
female
headed
home-
steads
71.4
30.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Homesteads without migrant labour
No. of
active
res.
produ-
cers
1.8
2.8
3.8
3.1
1.7
6.2
No. of
children
(<16)
3.0
5.1
6.6
3.9
1.4
8.5
No. of
elderly
(>55)
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
Depend-
ency
ratio
1.8
1.9
25
1.8
1.0
1.7
Source: 1990 Survey
As said, important for a solidarity group is the
number of active members it bas versus thé
number of non-actives. We took as proxy for thé
number of active members thé homesteads mem-
bers aged between 16 and 55 years old. For rea-
sons outiined below, we consider the number of
résident active members more important than thé
number of total active members. Non-active
members are thé children under 16 years and
homestead members above 55 years old. Al-
though both groups are seldom completely inac-
tive - children are often engaged in light dômes-
tic activities, and thé elderly are engaged in in-
come-generating activities - it can be safely stated
that their contribution to thé homestead's pro-
duction is insufficient to provide for their sub-
sistence. Neither will they contribute much when
one of thé active homestead members is tempo-
rarily indisposed. From Table 7 we can read thaï
thé numbers of résident producers are not the
same between thé two groups of homesteads: in
thé group with migrant labourers fewer people
are available on thé homestead to perform do-
mestic and agricultural activities. More impor-
tant in our context is thaï fewer producers are
present to take daily care of the non-producers.
This can be seen when looking at the depend-
ency ratio, which is defïned as thé total number
of résidents divided by thé number of active rési-
dent members. While in homesteads without
migrant labour thé dependency ratio is in most
stages below 2, this figure is above 2 for home-
steads with migrant labour in ail stages.
Why is thé migrant excluded as active member
when calculating this dependency ratio? One can
argue that migrants send home remittances and
in this way contribute to the welfare ofthose left
behind. To some extent this is true, but when we
consider thé contents of daily care of non-active
members thé exclusion can be justified. Daily care
of non-active members consists mostly of activi-
ties such as preparing and providing them with
food, providing for their water and fuel, clean-
ing their house, doing their washes and repair-
ing their clothes, going shopping for them, and
so on. So, daily care mainly consists of labour
activities, that can only be donc by résident home-
stead members. Sending remittances does pro-
vide means, but at the same time entails a loss of
résident labour power. Means hâve to be con-
verted into daily care as described. This work
will fall upon the resident active members, who,
moreover, will be mostly female.
Another effect of labour migration in this respect
i s that thé absence of male résident homestead
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members means thattheir 'traditional' tasks have
to be taken over by women. Especially in the ear-
lier stages of the development cycle, the migra-
tion of male members leads to a complete ab-
sence of male active members on the homestead.
In the establishment stage of the homestead 85.7
percent of the homesteads with migrant labour
had no such members. This means that tasks like
ploughingthe fields, herdingthe cattle, construc-
tion and repairing, harvesting and representing
the homestead become the task of women in ad-
dition to their already heavy workload. The time
available for taking care of the non-active mem-
bers - in the fïrst stages of the development cycle
mainly children (see Table 7) - will be less, and
this may have negative conséquences for their
welfare.
The above observations are narrowly related to
the discussion of the so called 'female headed
households'. Table 7 shows that in the establish-
ment and expansion stage of the homesteads with
migrant labour, 71.4 and 30.0 percent, respec-
tively, are female headed homesteads, because
of labour migration. Although women are al-
lowed to perform male activities in cases as de-
scribed above ('necessity has no law'), they have
great disadvantages when trying to obtain the
means to perform these activities. Appeals for
receiving more land from the chief, getting a trac-
tor or oxen in time for ploughing, receiving help
in construction activities, or help with légal dis-
putes, or in hiring in labour, all have less chance
to be heard and honoured when made by a
woman. Thus, while doing male activities on top
of their female work, women are also hampered
in these activities because of lack of support and
coopération.
The arguments mainly apply to relatively
'young' homesteads with young children who
need intensive daily care and supervision. The
relatively 'older' homesteads have more (male)
active members left behind, who will be better
able to cope with the extra workload as it can be
spread over several persons. Moreover, part of
the inactive members are elderly people, who
compared to children will be better able to take
care of themselves and need less daily care and
supervision.
Labour migration and the
durabiîity of the homestead
The durabiîity of a group of people is the third
social condition for functioning as a solidarity
group. For ail members it must be certain that
thé group will continue to exist when contingen-
cies occur and during thé whole period in which
conséquences are felt as resuit of the contingency.
Therefore, especially social groups that are able
to replace departing members over time are suit-
able as solidarity groups. Extended families or
clans are perfect solidarity groups from this point
of view. Although it would be too easy to suggest
that thé homestead is an extended family in ils
strict sensé, its continuing existence is certain to
ils mernbers. Because thé relations between
homestead members are based on kinship ties,
thé individual becomes a member of a kin group
when he or she is born, and will stay a member
till his or her death. In this way thé homestead is
far better suited as a solidarity group than groups
based on neighbourhood, friendship or contract.
In contrast to the latter forais, kinship exists rela-
tively independent of the will of the individual
and will survive the lifetime of an individual.
Furthermore, Partsch (1983: 100-1) states that
this condition is best fulfilled through kin groups
of which the existence is not threatened when
one of the members falls out. In two-generation
families the marriage of the children or the death
of the parents will finish the existence of the
group. In three-generation families this problem
does not occur. Through birth and marriage new
members are included, and the présence of three
générations ensures relatively easy care for chil-
dren and the elderly.
The durabiîity of the homestead, and the im-
pact labour migration has on it, can only be
analyzed when it is placed in the overall process
of change in Swazi economy and society. A gen-
era! idea in development literature is that in a
society that develops from a traditional subsist-
ence society toward a modern economy, extended
families develop towards nuclear families, that
is husband, wife and children (Murray 1981,
United Nations 1986). I distinguish between the
process whereby multi-household homesteads are
replaced by one-household homesteads and the
process whereby three or more génération home-
steads are replaced by two génération home-
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steads. Multi-household homesteads generale
from polygyny, as well as from married sons stay-
ing on their parents' homestead. The decrease
of polygyny was already observed by Kuper
(1947) and later by Allen (1973). The introduc-
tion of Christianity at the beginning of this cen-
tury has slowly led to a décline of polygyny. Fur-
thermore, there has been a decreasing incidence
of married sons staying with their own house-
holds on the parental homestead. Kuper (1947:
16) reported in this context, that the homestead
was decreasing from the old "multi-household"
ideal, because of "less need for defence, greater
independence of married couples (particularly
Christians) and limitations of land". It has al-
ready been argued that married sons or brothers
leave the homestead, because migrant labour
gives young men early opportunities to raise an
income allowing them to establish their own
homesteads. For homesteads in the establishment
and expansion stage an average age of the head
of 36 and 42 years respectively was found. Given
the average age of 55 years of the heads of home-
steads in the consolidation stage, one might sug-
gest that homesteads in earlier stages have bro-
ken away from their parent's homestead. A fur-
ther indication for households breaking away is
the finding that homesteads in the later stages of
the development cycle (fission and décline) con-
sist only of one household in which a widow or
elderly couple live alone with only one (unmar-
ried) son or daughter. Other children have left
the homestead and established their own home-
stead. It should be noted, however, that migrant
labour cannot be the only reason. Furthermore,
in the group of homesteads without migrants,
'young' homesteads can be found that broke away
from their parent's homestead. This might indi-
cate thaï, besides migrant labour providing early
cash opportunities, the other reasons mentioned
above are equally important, but we have no idea
of frequency and no idea why these homesteads
broke away. Respondents in the survey frequently
indicated that the reasons for households to stay
together on the same site are subject to rather
individual décisions nowadays, and not on what
society expects them to do. Labour migration
providing cash could well influence this déci-
sion, but this proposition cannot be supported by
data.
It is also thought that the durability of a solidar-
ity group is strengthened when it consists of three
or more générations. A conséquence of the ear-
lier break-up of homesteads as described above
is that 'young' homesteads consisting of two gén-
érations are created and 'older ' homesteads with
only one or two générations are left behind.
Table 8 shows that in the consolidation and fis-
sion stages the majority of homesteads have three
or more générations, but in the earlier stages and
in the décline stage two générations prevail, as
could be expected given the way homesteads are
classified.
Do homesteads increasingly resemble a model
of nuclear families, consisting of wife, husband
and children? As can be seen in Table 8, many
nuclear homesteads can be found in the estab-
lishment stage and in the expansion stage. This
means, from a durability point of view, that the
homestead as a social group still exists, but its
base has become smaller in several stages of the
homestead development cycle (establishment and
expansion stage). In contrast with the multi-
household homesteads, which can be considered
as being conti nuously in the consolidation stage,
one-household homesteads go through some
stages in which they can be considered relatively
vulnérable from a durability point of view. This
is aggravated for homesteads with migrant la-
bour, as the husband is absent most of the year.
Although migrants send money home, their la-
bour efforts cannot be used at home when the
wife is not able to work because of contingen-
cies. This might threaten the continuation of the
young homestead. Murray (1981) has shown for
Lesotho that these nuclear homesteads are very
vulnérable. Social and economie contingencies
can hardly be coped with, and the homestead will
frequently break down. The wife and her chil-
dren return to her parents' homestead or to her
husband's parents' homestead.
Murray (1981: 102-4) warns, however, that
nuclear families in developing countries often
appear as nuciear, but this is neither a structural
feature of these families nor does it mean a so-
cial and economie independence. Firstly, and
confirmed with data from Table 8, the homestead
consisting of a nuclear family is just a stage in
the development cycle, and will develop into a
more than two génération family. Secondly, nu-
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Table 8. Number of générations on homesteads and percentage of nuclear homesteads
(by stage in thé development cycle)
Stages in
homestead
development
cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Multi-household
homesteads
Homesteads with migrant labour
Number of
générations on
homestead
1:11.9%
2:88.9 %
2:18.2 %
3:23.1 %
2:18.2%
3:63.6 %
4:18.2%
2:143%
3:85.7 %
n.a.
3:77.8 %
4:22.2 %
% Nuclear
homesteads
86.0
30.8
0
0
n.a
0
Homesteads without migrant labour
Number o f
générations on
homestead
2:100.0%
2:80.0 %
3:20.0 %
2-20.0 %
3:80.0 %
2.125%
3:62.5 %
4:25.0 %
1:40.0%
2:40.0 %
3:10.0%
4:100%
3:75.0 %
4:25.0 %
% Nuclear
homesteads
100.0
40.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Source: 1990 Survey
clear families might appear isolated from their
wider environment because of separate sites, but
family gatherings take place for ail sorts of rea-
sons. The conclusion that separate sites of nu-
clear homesteads at the same time indicates so-
cial and économie independence, as is the case
in industrialized countries, does not always hold.
Observations in Swaziland showed that young
homesteads, when sited in thé same community,
hâve strong relationships with thé parent home-
stead. Sometimes thé social and économie inter-
action is so intensive that homesteads are sepa-
rated only geographically, but no more than this.
The above conclusions with respect to
'nuclearization' on Swazi Nation Land should
be treated with care.
In sum, the effect of labour migration on thé du-
rability of thé homestead is difficult to trace.
Migrant labour provides young homestead mem-
bers with sufficient cash to establish their own
homesteads. This gives them thé opportunity to
break away from homesteads sooner than in ear-
lier times. This process also leads to thé création
of a group of homesteads which are very 'young',
and consist of a nuclear family only. Thèse home-
steads are relatively vulnérable and unstable, and
their ability to fonction as solidarity groups must
be questioned. When young people leave thé pa-
rental homestead, thé homestead left behind will
also become more vulnérable, which may
threaten also their durability. Homesteads in thé
décline stage hâve just one or two générations,
consisting of mainly elderly people. The social
protection of thèse people is not guaranteed and
becomes more uncertain. Ail dépends, of course,
on thé strength of social ties between former
homestead members. Breaking away from thé
parental homestead does not mean that social
obligations are not fulfiïled, as will be shown in
thé next section.
In this section, there is one other influence of
migrant labour on thé durability of the home-
stead which I would like to mention. Among so-
190
cial scientists (including economists) it can fre- implies having strong obligations and rights to-
quentiy be heard that osciliating migration for ward other homestead members. These obliga-
the homesteads involved is a 'way of life', of tions and rights are well defined, and vary be-
which thé conséquences are Mly accepted and tween homestead members, given their sex, age,
integrated in the social and economie organiza- marital status and social position in the home-
tion of the homestead. However, the prolonged stead.
absence of one of the two adults in young fami- Being male or female is an important factor
lies distorts family life to a large extent and of- deterrniningthe obligations homestead members
ten créâtes psychological problems for the mi- have toward each other. The gender division of
grant and those left behind. The stress on women labour forces women into domestic and (subsis-
increases and feelings of neglect and loneliness tence) agricultural activities. This results in a re-
are more common than superficial surveys sug- stricted access to monetary earnings of female
gest. This, in turn, créâtes ils own social prob- homestead members and, therefore, women tra-
ïems like divorces, aîcoholism and broken fami- ditionally made their economie contributions to
lies. These problems undermine the homestead the homestead directly in labour (Russell 1984:
as solidarity group, and, with a lack of alterna- 19). And, as was already discussed, and more
îive mechanisms îhat provide social protection, spécifie to the rôle of women in thé homestead
a group of people is created for whom life be- as solidarity group, their contribution is derived
cornes highly uncertain and füll of insecuriîy. from thé gender division of labour: as domestic
activities also include daily care of the children,
thé elderly, sick, and disabled, women hâve an
Labour migration and 'normative important rôle in thé provision of social protec-
, tion to thé inactive members of the homestead.
insuraiice Male members have far more access to monetary
eamings and their contribution includes thé pro-
A final social condition for a group to be a soli- vision of goods, agricultural inputs and money.
darity group is a principle that obliges members In case improductive members need money for
to support other members when necessary; norms treatment or spécifie goods, mâle members will
or values that force members to redistribute be responsible for this.
means from those who hâve to those who hâve Age is another important factor determining
not. The existence of such a 'normative insur- obligations and rights within thé homestead.
ance' (Partsch 1983:67) is a prerequisite because Children have few obligations in Swazi society,
it ensures thaï individual members will contrib- although îhey are expected to contribute to la-
ute, and will contribute sufficientiy at times that bour, îike cattîe herding (young boys) or some
this is needed. Cusîomary law and mies, moral îight domestic activities (girls). When marrying,
principles and cominunity norms constitute a women and men have reached complete woman-
powerful means of assuring each group member and manhood in Swazi society. In this stage both
that coopération will ensue and the obligation married men and women are responsible for the
created will be enforced (Platteau 1991: 139). welfare of both the younger and the elder gen-
Within the homestead such moral principles ex- erations. When they themselves become older,
ist. Ngubane (1983: 104) says on this point: "it they have less to do with economie activities.
is the umuti which has first claim on a member, Younger générations will take the major part in
for its support of its members and especially those the economie pursuits of the homestead, and the
of his own house (indlu, A.L.) as wel! as gener- older people have an increasingly important po-
ally for the maintenance of the physical struc- sition in the social sphère (Marwick 1966: 68-
ture, its land and its livestock, as his or her cir- 71).
cumstances permit and his or her âge, sex and The marital status of the homestead member
marital status dictate more specifically. Even if influences the direction of the economie obliga-
only by sending money, or bringing goods when tions. The unmarried female stays at her parents'
he or she can, he or she should make his or her homestead and her labour efforts and her earn-
contribution". In sum, homestead membership ings accrue to her parents. When she manies,
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her productive efforts will accrue to her husband's
(father's) homestead. A young unmarried male
is in the same position as an unmarried woman.
His earnings should accrue for the largest part to
other members of the homestead, especially his
father. When hè is married, earnings accrue to
his own household, even though strong obliga-
tions to other homestead members continue, but
these resuit from âge or kin relations rather than
from being married or not.
Although Swazi make a distinction between
homestead membership and kinship ties, in prac-
tice these relationships often coincide. But kin-
ship in itself détermines also obligations and
rights homestead members have toward each
other. Within the homestead the main kin rela-
tions are between children and parents, among
siblings, and between wife and husband (affinai
kin relations). The obligations and rights between
children and parents change over a lifetime. Par-
ents are obliged to give to their children as long
as they are not able to produce their own means.
As soon as the latter happens, children begin to
take care of their parents. The classificatory kin-
ship System gives Swazi several 'fathers' and
'mothers' and, consequently, 'sons' and 'daugh-
ters', but the obligations to the biological par-
ents and children remain strengest. Füll broth-
ers and sisters have strong obligations toward
each other, while the obligations between half
siblings are less strict.
With regard to labour migration, it can be stated
in genera! that the migrant's position as absen-
tée and wage labourer does not change his obli-
gations and rights within the homestead. Home-
stead membership continues notwithstanding
someone's absence. Some members might be
away for many years, but will still be considered
as homestead members. Physical distance seldom
means social distance. For the homestead as soli-
darity group this would theoretically mean that
labour migration would not undermine the pat-
tern of rights and obligations homestead mem-
bers have toward each other. What happens, how-
ever, in social practice? To answer this question
we need to know some main characteristics of
the migrant. These are produced in Table 9.
Firstly, and not surprising, we see that all mi-
grants are male. Secondly, their age is in all stages
around 30 years. But in the different stages the
migrants are different members. This can be
clearly shown when the marital status and the
position of the migrant in the homestead are con-
Table 9. Main characteristics of migrants by stage in the homestead development cycle
Characteristics
migrants
Sex
Age
Married
Position in
homestead
Remittances per
resident homestead
member
Remittances äs % of
migrant's income
Stages in homesteads development cycle
Establishment
100 % male
30.4
77.8 %
81.0%
head
E 603
27%
Expansion
100 % male
29.4
61.5%
57.8 %
head
E 170
18%
Consolidation
100% male
31.1
54 5 %
27 3 %
head
E 130
19%
Fission
100% male
30.4
57.1%
28.6 %
head
E 285
26%
Multi-
household
homesteads
100 % male
35.4
66.7 %
27.8 %
head
E 125
19%
Source: 1990 Survey
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sidered. In the establishment stage and expan-
sion stage migrants are young men, who are
married or about to be married (they already live
together with their future spouse, but the bride
priée has not yet been completely paid). In many
cases these migrants are also heads of home-
sïeads.
Combined, these characteristics can give an ex-
planation for the amount of remittances sent
home and the share remittances have in the mi-
grant's total income. A male migrant who is
married and also homestead head has large re-
sponsibilities toward the welfare of the other
homestead members, and is reflected in the large
share of his income sent home and high remit-
tances per resident homestead member. There can
be no doubt that in these stages migrants are sel-
dom neglecting their obligations. In the later
stages of the deveîopment cycle and in case of
multi-household homesteads, migrants are
mostly unmarried and a minority heads of home-
steads. In the latter case the elderly head has al-
ready îransferred his 'headship' to his son. As
the majority of the migrants in the later stages
are, however, young unmarried men, one would
expect them to send a lot of money home, given
the outlined obligations they have toward their
parents. The opposite can be observed. It was
already explained that these young men migrate
to collect fimds to be able to establish their own
homestead. The tendency of homestead members
wanting to leave the parental homestead brings
a tension between the obligation as unmarried
male, to give his income to other homestead
members, and the création of a fund, which is
necessary to establish an own homestead. The
interests of the individual collide with the inter-
ests of the homestead as a whole to take care of
the welfare of all its members. It is at this point
that labour migration undermines the genera!
principles of distribution.
Besides his homestead position in terms of age,
sex, marital status and being head or not, the
migrant's place in the kinship System will déter-
mine his obligation also. Migrants from home-
steads in thé establishment and expansion stages
send money home, among other reasons, for thé
welfare of his children; migrants from home-
steads in later stages send money home for thé
welfare of their parents. This is all part of the
intergenerational contracts based on reciprocity,
in which parents take care of their children in
order to be taken care of by them in times of old
age. An important observation in this context can
be derived from a study by Russell (1984) on thé
redistribution of cash in Swazi society. A major
conclusion of her study is that remittances are
not just sent 'home', but sent to a range of spé-
cifie individuals to whom, because of spécifie
relationships, migrants feel a particular obliga-
tion (Russell 1984: 4). Kinship relations indi-
cate thé unes of responsibility. Therefore, a mi-
grant will send money to thé household in whose
kitchen he eats, the kitchen of the woman feed-
ing his children, the women hè sleeps with, his
mother and father (which may be several 'fathers'
and 'mothers' because of the classificatory kin-
ship system) and grandparents.
Notwithstanding the case of the young unmar-
ried male, there are no further indications that
the migrant in genera! wants to escape his obli-
gations which dérive from homestead member-
ship and kinship. An important reason for fiil-
filling his obligations is, of course, that the mi-
grant can foresee that his migrancy will be tem-
porary, and, eventually, he will have to return
home. Moreover, he will be dependent on his
homestead when he falls sick, or becomes un-
employed. It is precisely these social security rea-
sons, of not losing his rights that hè needs when
hè returns home, which will force migrants to
keep close social links with their homestead and
send remittances. His rights will be like those of
any other man in Swazi society. Although little
information is availabîe, my own observations
seem to confirm that being a migrant does not
influence someone's rights to resources and help
in Swazi society.
In the context of this section, another interesting
observation of Russell (1984) is that the control
over money in Swazi society is highly individu-
alized, and the spending is at the discrétion of
the earners. However, the exchanges of the earned
money are still part of the broader pattern of reci-
procity, which is highly generalized. This gen-
eralised reciprocity ensures a (redistribution of
means that to a large extent will provide each
member of the homestead or kinship group with
what hè needs. But the incorporation of money
into the gifts circuit cannot alter the fact that
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money is frequently not considered as a gift in
the sense described above. According to Russell
(1984: 2) money has introduced calculation,
which is one of its functions in the market
economy. People will start to calculate their debts
or crédits toward each other. The resuit might be
that people who cannot give themselves, do not
any longer receive what they need, with serious
conséquences for their welfare. In this way mi-
grant labour might indirectly undermine the prin-
ciple of generalized reciprocity underlying the
homestead's capacity to function as solidarity
group.
Conclusions
For the rural population in Swaziland the home-
stead is the most important social and economie
unit in Swazi society. Providing social protec-
tion to its members is one of its functions. In this
paper the central question was how labour mi-
gration of homestead members to South Africa
affects the homestead as a solidarity group. To
answer this question I tried to indicate relation-
ships between labour migration and several con-
ditions that make a social group function as a
solidarity group.
In the previous sections some major conclu-
sions have already been drawn. An overall esti-
mation of the impact of labour migration on the
homestead as solidarity group will be difficult to
make. This article has clearly shown that the
impact diflers according the type of homestead
we are talking about. The homestead develop-
ment cycle theory was adopted to capture the
socio-économie différences among homesteads
nowadays. Labour migration can be found in all
stages of the development cycle, but the motives
underlying migration are different between
stages. For young homesteads labour migration
is often a must, for older homesteads labour mi-
gration is a choice of individual homestead mem-
bers who are looking for own income and inde-
pendence.
The major conclusion that can be drawn is that,
as a solidarity group, homesteads in the estab-
lishment and expansion stage are far more af-
fected by labour migration than homesteads in
the other stages. To some extent this seems para-
doxical. For homesteads in the establishment and
expansion stage labour migration is precisely for
social security reasons, to secure the subsistence
base of the homesteads, when no other options
for income génération are open. At the same time
labour migration has a large impact on the abil-
ity of the homestead to function as a solidarity
group. The social and economie characteristics
of homesteads in the earlier stages of the devel-
opment cycle are already more unfavourable for
their rôle as a solidarity group, compared with
homesteads in other stages or multi-household
homesteads. Although labour migration taises a
relatively high income for thé 'young' home-
steads, and may give more freedom to women to
engage in income-generating activities (expan-
sion stage), it negatively influences thé size, com-
position, économie vulnerability, and durabiliiy
of the homestead; ail important conditions for a
social group to function also as a solidarity group.
In thé latter stages of the development cycle thèse
négative influences are felt less, although they
may return in the décline stage.
It is assumed that each homestead more or less
follows thé pattern of the homestead development
cycle as outlined in this article. The négative ef-
fects of labour migration for thé homestead as a
solidarity group will then be felt only temporar-
ily and offset in time. This nevertheless means
that homesteads go through stages in which they
are less able to function as a solidarity group than
in other stages, and thaï labour migration might
further weaken thèse 'weak' stages. In thèse
stages they will be less able to cope with contin-
gencies and setbacks themselves, and will have
to rely on external support relations. The main
question for thé homesteads involved will be
whether or not these external relations can be
operationalized when they are needed. The sur-
vival of the homestead members may dépend on
it.
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Appendix A Criteria used for the
classification of homesteads
For the classification of homesteads according to thei
stage in thé development cycle, the criteria outlinec
in Table A were used.
Table A. Criteria used to classify homesteads accord
ing to their place in thé homestead development cycl
As can be derived from Table A.I., the classificatie
adopted is based primarily on homestead size. Thrt
size groups are isolated: those with populations of or
to six, seven to ten, and eleven or more persons. A
homesteads in thé latter category are assumed to be
thé consolidation stage. The smallest homesteads wi
six persons or less are presumed to be in thé esta
lishment stage if (a) there are no children on the hom
stead, thé homestead has three persons or less and t!
homestead head is less than 40 years of âge, and (b)
thé homestead head is less than 50 years old and
any children under 15 years are présent. The '(t
group' of homesteads in thé establishment stage ce
sists of homesteads for which thé décline stage is
the same time the establishment stage. Thèse hoir
steads are clear examples of young homesteads le?
ing the parent's homestead. The establishment sta
takes only a few years, because with children bc
the homestead will soon enter the expansion sta;
All other homesteads with six persons or less are
sumed to be in the décline stage. In the latter grc
one of the children has taken over the parent's esl
and stays with them till their death, or the old pee
stay on themselves.
Homesteads with seven to 10 persons are in the
pansion stage if (a) the homestead head is less t!
50 years old and 25 percent or more of the memt
are children under 16 (child/population ratio lar
than 0.24), and (b) if the homestead head is less t
50 years of age and 50 percent or more of the ho
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stead members are children under 16 years old (child/
population ratio larger than 0.49). The expansion stage
will last until the completion of the homestead's fam-
ily of procréation. The biological limiting factor is the
duration of the wife's fertility. All other homesteads
with seven to ten members are assumed to be in the
fission stage. The fission stage starts with the mar-
riage of the oldest child and continues till all of them
are married. They will subsequently leave the home-
stead. Homesteads with more than 10 members are
assumed to be in the consolidation stage, a stage in
which younger children grow up and the family stays
together.
It must be noted that the above classification proce-
dure does not strictly categorize homesteads in terms
of their position in the domestic development cycle.
Rather it places homesteads into stages of an ideal-
ized development cycle on the basis of size, age and
compositional characteristics that best fit the ideal-
ized stages (see Low 1986: 89, note 4). The number
of persons has been taken as the number of living per-
sons belonging to the homestead as recorded in the
1990 survey.
Table A.
Criteria used to classify homesteads according to their place in the homestead development cycle
Criteria /
homestead
frequency
Homestead size
Age of head
Children
< 15 years
Child / population
ratio
Frequency own
sample
% of Total
Sample Low
Homestead development cycle
Stage 1
establishment
(a) 1 - 3a
(b) 1 - 6b
(a)<40a
(b)<50b
(a) = 0
(b)>0
--
16
17.2
12.0
Stage 2
expansion
7-10
(a) < 50a
(b)<55b
(a) > 0.24
(b) > 0.49
23
24.7
22.1
Stage 3
consolidation
>10
--
--
27
29.0
26.5
Stage 4
fission
7-10
Other
than
Stage 2
15
16.1
20.3
Stage 5
décline
1-6
Other
than
Stage 1
12
12.9
19.1
Sources: Adapted from Low (1986: 83), Table 7.17, and Survey 1990
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